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LABOUR LORE AND LABOUR LAW: A NORTH
AMERICAN VIEW OF THE DANISH EXPERIENCE
By
H. W. ARTHURS *
INTRODUCTION

THE Danish success in achieving industrial peace is so universally
acclaimed that a study of it requires no apologies. But apart from
the intrinsic appeal of a successfully functioning system, a student
of legal institutions and arrangements cannot fail to gain a deeper
understanding of his immediate legal environment by examining it
from a new vantage-point. It is the latter consideration, as much
as the former, which motivates this study. If, as Holmes says, the
life of the law is not logic but experience, we should not hesitate to
profit vicariously from the experience of others.
I am anxious to point out that I do not read or speak Danish.
The presence of this language barrier to primary materials forced
reliance upon two other major sources of information: First,
translations of basic public documents, English-language pamphlets
on Danish labour relations and labour law, and the classic study of
Professor Galenson.1 In so far as insights culled from these sources
may appear in this study, my debt to them is gratefully acknowledged. I do not, however, feel entitled to claim the scholarly
exactitude which can only come from first-hand research. Secondly,
interviews with persons engaged in labour affairs in Denmark.
Interviews often reveal attitudes and subtleties not readily discernible in printed matter; on the other hand the persons interviewed
unanimously asked, as the price of frankness, assurances that views
expressed would be reported without attribution of source. Accordingly, I ask the reader's indulgence for my failure to identify the
source of many statements.
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. This study was
made possible by the generosity of the Canadian Department of LabourUniversities Research Committee. Such realism as may flesh the bare bones
of statutory analysis is entirely attributable to the intellectual hospitality of
officials of the Danish Government, the Danish Employers' Confederation,
and the Danish Federation of Trade Unions, together with several individuals
professionally engaged in labour relations matters. [For a comparative view
of labour law in other European countries, see Labour Law in Europe: with
special reference to the Common Market, International and Comparative Law
Quarterly Supplementary Publication No. 5 (1962).-Ed.]
1 Galenson, The Danish System of Labor Relations, A Study in Industrial
Peace (1952).
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THE

BACKGROUND

2

The roots of collective action in Denmark run deep. The medieval
Guild system, with its tradition of organisation for both masters
and journeymen, persisted in Denmark, formally, until 1862. By
this date the industrial revolution had begun, although industry
was still organised primarily in small workshops employing an
average of twenty to thirty workers. Significant industrial expansion dates from about 1870, and was from its inception accompanied
by the development of organisations of employers and employees.
Whether these organisations were directly descended from the
Guilds is a matter of controversy; early attempts at unionism
certainly stemmed from socialist agitation. There is no doubt,
however, that dissolution of the Guilds did leave a vacuum in the
labour market which-given the organisational tradition-was filled
within twenty-five years by the emergence of centralised union and
employers' organisations. These central organisations have played
a pre-eminent role in the development of the Danish labour market,
and in the rules which govern it.
Without at this point tracing the internal structure of the
Danish Employers' Confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiversforening or
" D.A.") and the Danish Federation of Trade Unions (De
Samvirkende Fagforbund, colloquially the " Landsorganisation '"
or " L.O.") both of these organisations had appeared by 1899, and
were in that year to meet in a major test of strength.
A lockout of major proportions was called-involving some 20
per cent. of the non-agricultural work force-for the purpose of
waging preventive war against the growing power of the unions.
The dispute was bitter, long (some 3 million working days were
lost), and costly to both sides. It is the genius-and the good
fortune-of the Danes that at this lowest point in their industrial
relations they were able to lay the groundwork for a remarkably
stable and workable system. The settlement of the lockout, in
September 1899, was embodied in a document which has formed
the basis of substantive Danish labour law down to the present
(subject, only, to a revision in November 1960).
THE

BASIC

AGREEMENT

A synopsis 3 of the ground rules laid down in this Agreement is
useful:
Section 1 (1) In recognition of the desirability of having questions
concerning wages and working conditions settled by
2 See Galenson, op. cit., c. 1.

3 See Appendix 1, infra, for the full text of the " September Agreement " of
1899, as amended in November 1960.
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the conclusion of collective agreements, if necessary
of the central organisawith the participation
bind themselves
tions, the central organisations
neither directly nor indirectly to obstruct employers
within
and workers from organising themselves
of the central
framework
the organisational
organisations.
(1) When a collective agreement has been concluded,
and for its duration, no stoppage of work (strike,
blockade, lockout, or boycott) may be effected
within the scope of the agreement unless warranted
" Standard Rules for Settlement of Labour
by the
Disputes " or by existing collective agreements.
Sympathetic strikes or sympathetic lockouts may,
however, be effected in accordance with current
agreements and legal practice.
&
(4) provide for a vote of any group affected by the
(3)
work stoppage, and for notice of any proposed work
stoppage to the opposite central organisation.
(5) obliges the central organisation " not to support,
but by all reasonable means to prevent, unlawful
stoppages of work " and to bring such stoppages to
an end.
The central organisations shall be responsible for
Section 3
ensuring that agreements concluded between them
are respected and carried out by all affiliated

Section 2

Section 4

organisations.
rights " to direct and
(1) guarantees management's
distribute work and to use what labour may in their
judgment be suitable " subject to the responsible
exercise of this right so as not to violate workers'

rights.
(2) prohibits unilateral change of piece rates through
job re-evaluation unless the worker is compensated
for any loss.
(3) provides protection against arbitrary dismissal, and
the remedy therefor.
Sections 5 & 6 draw the line between managerial personnel and
Section 7

employees.
(1) provides for three months' notice of termination of
collective agreements.
extends the provisions of a lapsed
(2) automatically
agreement until a new agreement is signed or a work
stoppage occurs.
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Section 8
Section 9

acknowledges the desirability of shop stewards.
The
two central organisations will promote co(1)
operation between the organisations and work for
peaceful and stable working conditions . . . through

joint industrial committees. ....
(2) Collective agreements should aim at wage systems
which will promote productivity. ...
(3) No party may prevent a worker from doing as much
and as good work as his abilities and his training
permits.
Section 10
commits breaches of this agreement or of collective
agreements to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court 4
subject to prior consultation between the parties.
Section 11
provides that this agreement continues to bind
affiliates of the two central organisations notwithstanding their withdrawal from membership.
It is important to note that for over sixty years this Agreement
has been virtually the only substantive " law " in the field of
labour relations; that this " law " has been self-imposed, by agreement not legislation; and that the enforcement of the rules has been
entrusted to the Labour Court, an essentially private tribunal
(albeit one with statutory warrant).
With the Basic Agreement as a framework, the functioning of
the system can best be understood by a brief description of the two
central organisations, the process of collective bargaining, and the
network of tribunals erected by the parties to administer the
system.
THE CENTRAL ORGANISATIONS

A. The Danish Employers' Confederation
Employer organisation in Denmark has no counterpart in North
America.
The Danish Employers' Confederation (" D.A.")
embraces approximately 18,000 employers who employ approximately 50 per cent. of the work force (including agriculture). Most
firms not affiliated to the D.A., either directly or through a trade
association, are organised into independent trade associations.
The D.A. carries on an extensive and intensive management

training programme at both the supervisory and executive level,5
a statistical
legislative

and research operation, as well as public relations and
Its
activities in the general interests of its members.

primary function, however, is the conduct of industrial relations,
4 Properly called the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
5 Including two schools which run on a more or less full-time basis offering
excellent seminars of varying lengths on a variety of topics.
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two of its constitutional objects being " to contribute towards the
avoidance as far as possible of disputes between employers and
workers or to seek their solution by peaceful means without work
stoppages," and " to contribute towards the maintenance of a
spirit of solidarity and a common approach on the part of
employers' organisations so as to protect employers' common
interests in all questions concerning wages and working conditions "
(section 2).
The effective achievement of these objectives requires a delegation by individual employers to their association of substantial
authority in matters relating to industrial relations. That this has
been accomplished has been attributed 6 to a variety of factors:
a tradition of organisation under the Guilds (some of which were
actually transformed into employers' associations); the small unit
size of many employers requiring organisation for self-protection;
the absence of any extreme competitive spirit because of a limited
domestic market; and a small and stable community structure.
The D.A. is primarily a federation of trade associations, with
provision being made for membership by individual firms ineligible
to join any trade association. Its government is hierarchical, with
a large general assembly (600 members), a central committee of
fifty-four, and an executive committee of fifteen. As might be
expected, the latter is the effective policy-maker. Day-to-day affairs
are conducted by a substantial secretariat whose knowledge and
professional skills in all matters relating to the D.A.'s programme
are impressive. The attitude of the professional labour relations
personnel towards labour leaders with whom they are in constant
contact is, in my opinion, a major factor in the Danish success.
Certainly it is radically different from the typical North American
attitude and is in advance, as well, of the attitude of many individual Danish employers. As Galenson notes: " The chief work
of the secretariat is the amicable adjustment of labour disputes;
it is the executive committee and the higher representative bodies
that are called upon to conduct industrial warfare." 7 This devotion to " amicable adjustment " seems to stem not merely from
a respect and understanding based upon constant personal
involvement. It is rather a considered professional judgment,
unclouded by that personal financial or psychological commitment
to the outcome of the particular dispute, which an employer
inevitably has.
The constitution of the D.A. forbids affiliates (without the
consent of the executive committee) to bargain over wages and
6
7

See Galenson, op. cit., c. 5.

At p. 81.
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working conditions, or to enter into collective agreements. The
D.A. itself conducts negotiations on behalf of its affiliates and
" recommends " wage policies to which they inevitably adhere."
D.A. affiliates are required to attempt to settle disputes with their
union counterpart but, failing settlement, carriage of the matter
passes to the D.A. which has exclusive authority to deal with the
L.O.
The imposition of economic sanctions against trade unions is
also regulated by the D.A. which, in its early years, followed a
rather aggressive policy. Lockouts (a phenomenon not unknown in
Denmark) must be authorised by the unanimous vote of the executive committee or a three-quarters vote of the central committee,
upon application by one of the D.A. affiliates. All member
employers are required to obey a lockout order, subject to their
right to apply for individual exemption in special cases. Employers
not involved directly in a work stoppage are required to abstain
from profiting by accepting work that would have been performed
by the employers engaged in the dispute, and from employing
striking or locked-out workers. The D.A. has power to order its
members to boycott non-member employers who act contrary to
the interests of members involved in a stoppage.
All of these provisions are enforceable by fine (imposed by the
D.A. Arbitration Board) and-ultimately-by
expulsion. The D.A.
maintains a special " Industrial Relief Fund," financed by an
0-25 per cent. payroll levy, from which benefits are paid to
employers engaged in work stoppages.
The D.A. also provides representation for its members before
the various labour tribunals, provides bargaining data and negotia" unfair "
tors, and protects the interests of its members against
wage competition by non-members.
The D.A.'s extensive activities are financed by compulsory
contributions calculated as a percentage of the payroll of each
member. The right of members to resign is stringently circumscribed (except where a business is sold or wound up) and neither
resignation nor expulsion releases a member from his existing
obligations. Structurally, the D.A. is thus designed to withstand
internal pressures from dissident members against centrallyformulated policies. In sum, the organisation is a complete,
effective labour relations agency armed with the human and
material resources to protect the interests of its members.
8 While couched in terms of a " recommendation," D.A. wage policy is binding
upon all affiliates. D.A. Constitution, s. 27d.
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B. The Danish Federation of Trade Unions
The Danish Federation of Trade Unions (the " L.O.") represents approximately 97 per cent. of all organised workers, 60 per
cent. of the total work force (including agriculture) and 90 per cent.
of those persons employed in manufacturing, construction, transAs the basis of an understanding
portation, and communications.
of its internal organisation, it must be noted that one union (the
Labourers' Union) comprises approximately 50 per cent. of the
total membership, while the smallest affiliates (comprising 40 per
cent. of the total number of affiliates) account for only 4 per cent.
of the total membership.
Without detailing the development of
the present structure,9 strong centrifugal forces are obviously to
be expected.
Complicating the situation are the multiplicity of
small unions organised primarily on craft lines.
The L.O. generally offers to its affiliates public relations and
adult education and union leadership
legislative representation,
training, and statistical research. In addition, the L.O. has been
active in politics through its affiliation with the Danish Social
Democratic Party,o0
and has fostered a number of consumer
co-operatives.
Although each affiliated union nominally preserves sovereignty
over its own affairs (including the execution of collective agreements) and is not bound by L.O. directives, the L.O. does exercise
considerable influence over its affiliates. This influence can only be
understood within the context of the Basic Agreement.
Because
that Agreement demands that the L.O. represent its affiliates in
negotiations with the D.A., it has conferred upon the L.O. a
position of prestige which enables it to co-ordinate and plot collective bargaining strategy.
This is customarily accomplished by an
inter-union conference convened by the L.O. in advance of
negotiations.
Similarly, the Basic Agreement provides that the L.O. represent
its affiliates before various tribunals and thus equips the L.O. with
the power of moral suasion in the settlement of disputes which
come before those tribunals. In regard to strikes and lockouts the
L.O. may (but seldom does) withhold strike assistance if it disapproves of a strike. Finally, the L.O. provides machinery for the
adjudication of jurisdictional disputes.11
9 See Galenson. c. 3.
10 This " affiliation " takes the form of consultation, financial contribution, and
representation in party councils. It does not involve formal membership on
the fashion of the English Labour Party, or Canadian New Democratic
Party.
11 See infra.
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Organisationally, the L.O. resembles the D.A. in several
respects. Like the D.A., the L.O. receives a per capita levy from
its affiliates; as in the D.A., the attitude of the L.O. professional
staff 12 can only be characterised as enlightened. However, while
the L.O. appears to enjoy a degree of authority over its affiliates
far greater than that enjoyed by British 13 and North American 14
labour federations, its authority falls short of that enjoyed by the
D.A. Because the L.O.'s strength derives from the pressure of
external forces-those generated by the Basic Agreement-rather
than from a constitutional foundation, its ability to advocate and
execute policy is often inhibited.
RECOGNITION, THE DUTY TO BARGAIN, THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE

The problem of employer recognition of unions and the refusal to
bargain collectively which so vexed North American labour relations prior to the passage of compulsory collective bargaining
legislation-with its residue of mistrust and antagonism-has not
been a significant problem in Denmark since 1899. The September
Agreement of that year is an implicit acknowledgment by each
party of the other's right to pursue its legitimate objectives and (in
its present draft) expressly recognises the desirability of collective
agreements and the rights of self-organisation.
In the few recognition disputes which have occurred in recent
decades (with unaffiliated employers) the use of economic pressure
has been held lawful. Thus Danish labour, like British labour, has
exhibited little interest in constructing an elaborate legal mechanism, on the North American model,'" to deal with the problem of
recognition. Rather, it has been thought that a union too weak to
compel recognition lacks the requisite bargaining power effectively
to negotiate a collective agreement.
The allied problem of employer interference with union membership was similarly solved by the September Agreement. From its
12 Unlike the D.A., the L.O. does not employ a lawyer on its staff.
13 Flanders and
Clegg (eds.), The System of Industrial Relations in Great
Britain (1960), p. 174 et seq.
14 Goldberg, A.F.L.-C.I.O.:
Labor United (1956).
15 In both the United States and Canada an administrative
agency (the " labour
relations board ") is assigned the task of determining whether or not a
particular union represents the majority of employees in an enterprise or some
convenient portion thereof. Armed with the board's " certificate " of majority
status, a union is entitled to require of the employer that he bargain with it.
in good faith, with a view to concluding a collective agreement which will
bind all employees. While an employer is free to recognise and deal with
a union without resort to the " certification " procedure, in Canada, at least,
the existence of the legal method of securing recognition from an employer
displaces the union's right to assert economic pressure for the same end:
Gagnon v. Foundation Maritime Ltd. [1961] S.C.R. 435.
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inception the Labour Court regarded employer activity designed to
discourage union membership as an attempt to derogate from the
September Agreement by attempting the destruction of the other
party. It is Galenson's thesis that: " [I]t was in removing the
troublesome issue of the right to organise from the Danish labor
arena that this unique document made its greatest contribution to
industrial peace."

16

It may be useful to speculate upon the reasons for the failure
of American

17

and Canadian is legislation,

protecting

the right to

organise, to bring to an end labour strife caused by the refusal of
some employers to recognise unions or to allow their employees to
participate in them. Might one reason be the feeling of North
American employers that the right to organise, and the corresponding duty to recognise, unions was thrust upon them by an
unfriendly legislature at the urging of a politically powerful labour
lobby ? The attitude of the Danish employer, by contrast, is that
he enjoys a proprietary interest in a system based upon a consensus
(The Basic Agreement of 1899) to which he has voluntarily subscribed. As a " law-maker " the employer is thus psychologically
committed to adherence to the law.
THE CONCILIATION BOARD

The major intrusion of the Government into the system erected by
the parties has been in the area of conciliation. The Conciliation
Act of 1910, originally passed, and since amended, on the basis of
joint management-labour representations to Parliament, establishes
a Conciliation Board.
Three Conciliators are appointed by the Minister of Labour, on
the recommendation of the Labour Court, for three-year terms, one
retiring each year. They elect a chairman from among their
number. Obviously, the Conciliators to be effective must enjoy the
confidence of the parties, and the recently retired chairman of the
Board, Mr. Erik Dreyer, held that position for approximately
twenty-five years. In addition, a number of Mediators are
appointed to assist the Conciliators, their tenure of office being
identical.
The Conciliation Board maintains surveillance of labour conflict
by requiring the filing of all collective agreements, and of notices
of any work stoppage.
At p. 102.
National Labor Relations Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, as amended.
18 Collective Bargaining Act (Ont.), 1943; P.C. 1003 (Can.), 1944; Ontario
Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202.
16

17
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If there is an actual or threatened work stoppage of " social
importance " a Conciliator has power to convene the parties for
discussion following unsuccessful direct negotiations. He is also
empowered to assist the parties in negotiating new agreements even
though they have not terminated their direct negotiations. Upon
being summoned by the Conciliator, the parties are required to
designate their representatives and to attend before him.
As a condition of entering upon his duties, the Conciliator may
require the parties to postpone a threatened work stoppage for a
period not exceeding two weeks. In cases where the stoppage
would affect " essential public institutions or services," is " of
far-reaching social importance," or (though per se not important)
would " be likely to prejudice decisively the possibilities of an
amicable settlement of the dispute as a whole," a further two-week
postponement may be imposed by the unanimous vote of the three
Conciliators. In this special group of cases all three Conciliators
may decide to intervene jointly.
To assist the Conciliator in obtaining a factually accurate view
of the situation, he may compel the parties to furnish him with
statements. Of course, Conciliators are charged with a standing
obligation to " keep themselves acquainted with the general situation at the time as regards industrial conditions, and particularly
wage conditions." Where, in the course of mediation, the Conciliator finds that matters of a technical nature have not been
properly discussed by the parties, he may require them to resume
direct negotiations and (subject to a time limit) may meanwhile
adjourn the mediation proceedings.
The effective operation of the Act is best seen in the context of
a discussion of the mechanics of collective bargaining. It is
characteristic that the legislation dovetails with the Standard Rules
for Negotiation established by agreement between the L.O. and the
D.A.
THE COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING PROCESS

Collective agreements in Denmark are usually entered into by
" sub-organisations " affiliated to the D.A. or the L.O. (e.g.,
between an employers' association representing all employers in
the woodworking industry, and a group of unions representing
(among them) the employees in that industry). Negotiations, however, are carried out under the aegis of the central organisations
and subject to the Standard Rules for Negotiation of Agreements
established by them.19 By virtue of these rules, all collective
agreements expire on March 1. This date is significant in that it
11 See Appendix two, infra.
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represents a compromise between union insistence upon a summer
expiry date (timed to coincide with the period of high employment
and high production levels) and employer insistence upon a winter
expiry date (during the slack season).
Given this uniform expiry date, it was possible for the parties
to create, and to adhere to, a tight schedule of negotiations.
The first move for a party desiring revision of an existing agreement is to deliver to the opposite party, prior to November 1, a
list of proposed changes.
Where no notice is given, the agreement
remains in force. Negotiations then commence between the " suband continue until December 1, with or without
organisations,"
If the negotiations succeed, a new
the assistance of a Mediator.
if
is
concluded;
they fail, the central organisations
agreement
The " subassume the onus at the next stage of negotiations.
"
report to the central organisation the progress of
organisations
their negotiations,
including those questions which have been
settled and those still outstanding.
All bargaining from December 1 forward looks towards the
submission of proposed collective agreements to both parties for
ratification. For purposes of the ratification vote all sub-organisations are lumped together in eight occupational groups 20 which
together embrace the entire work force. All results achieved at any
stage in the bargaining after December 1 are incorporated in the
proposed agreements later submitted for ratification.
After December 1 the central organisations appoint six-man
negotiating committees which meet forthwith and begin to bargain.
" general " and " nonBargaining demands are classified as
"
relevant to all or the majority
general," the former being those
of fields covered by agreements, such as demands relating to hours
of work, changes in rates of wages, changes in rules governing . . .
holidays . . . , social amenities, and questions about the duration of
The central organisations conduct negotiations on
agreements."
matters so defined, and on other matters mutually conceded to be
The Conciliator may be
appropriate for centralised bargaining.
invited to assist informally at this stage.
These negotiations continue until December 20, at which time
the Conciliation Board is advised officially of the state of the negotiations, and is invited to preside over the negotiations, with a view
the
to their completion by January 20.
During negotiations,
Conciliator may make proposals respecting concessions which would
The dispute then enters the
be conducive to amicable settlements.
20

The eight are: metal trades; textile and clothing; food and drink; other
industries, including woodworking;building and construction;transportation;
graphic industries (including paper goods); office and commercialemployees.
I.C.L.Q.-12

9
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mediation stage. The Conciliator, after consultation with the
representatives of both parties, prepares a proposed collective agreement, embodying the terms thus far agreed upon, together with
terms which he has reason to believe are likely to be mutually
acceptable.
While the central organisations are thus engaged in bargaining
over 4 general " demands, the sub-organisations continue their
negotiations over " non-general " demands under the supervision
of the central organisations. If such negotiations are unsuccessful,
the parties may remit outstanding issues to a Joint Committee or to
the Conciliation Board. The Conciliation Board may commence
to mediate the issues referred to it, or may also remit them to a
Joint Committee.
The Joint Committees comprise partisan representatives from
each of the central organisations, from each of the parties to the
agreement, and from the occupational group within whose framework ratification must take place. All issues are decided by the
Joint Committee by majority vote, and, failing a majority, by an
umpire. The issues committed to the Joint Committee, which
frequently involve the consideration of local conditions, or piecerate structures peculiar to particular trades, may be decided before
or after the conclusion of new agreements. All " non-general "
demands not so dealt with are negotiated under the aegis of a
Mediator, and his proposals will then be included in the proposed
collective agreements to be voted upon by the various occupational
groups.
The final step in the process is the submission by the Conciliator
to the parties of a proposed collective agreement. In practice,
where there is no hope that the parties will agree, the Conciliator
usually withdraws. After consulting the parties as to the formal
aspects of the proposed collective agreement, the Conciliator fixes
a time within which they must accept or reject it. A ratification
vote is then conducted by each of the parties by secret ballot which
affords a simple negative or affirmative choice. The voting constituencies are the eight occupational groups, although there may
be different agreements (with common " general " terms) before
the various sub-organisations which comprise a particular
occupational group.
The Conciliation Act establishes complex voting rules intended
to prevent distortion of the result should a vigorous minority vote
and an indifferent majority abstain. Similarly, provision is made
for giving proper weight to the result of votes taken at union
meetings rather than by membership ballot, since the results of all
votes throughout the entire occupational group are pooled and
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ratification or rejection is binding on all sub-organisations embraced
by the group.
The actual mechanics of the collective bargaining process are,
for a North American, irrelevant.
What may be instructive is an
attempt to distil the essential factors in the system which help to
produce successful bargaining.
Apart from the characteristic
Danish r6gime of self-imposed law, there is an evident intertwining
of the private and the public legal processes. The Conciliation Act
is obviously tailor-made to fit the processes agreed to by the parties
in the Standard Rules for Negotiation.
At the same time, the
Conciliator does not merely act as a conduit between the L.O. and
His ability to draft proposed collective agreements
the D.A.
potentially enlists the prestige of the State on behalf of a particular
settlement, and subjects the parties to the pressures of public
opinion.21 This fact must be weighed against strong opposition
from both labour and management to direct public intervention in
the bargaining process, although the right of the Conciliator to
" of
far-reaching social importance " may reprepostpone strikes
sent some retreat from purely private negotiations.
Again, there
have been some eighteen occasions in the past fifty years when Parliament has chosen to legislate particular proposed agreements prepared by the Conciliator and rejected by one of the parties (usually
management).
Increasingly resorted to in recent years (most
in
1961), parliamentary intervention may be inevitable
recently
where nation-wide bargaining has grave repercussions for the
national economy.22
Aside from ad hoc public intervention, the parties are free to
make their own bargain. It is interesting to note that they have
chosen to use the whole range of negotiating procedures from direct
bargaining (initially); to conciliation (the Conciliator's role prior to
his making a proposal); to arbitration (voluntarily, of non-general
to mediation
(the proposed collective
agreement
demands);
advanced by the Conciliator). These procedures each are felt to be
appropriate at the particular stage and in the particular circumstances in which they are invoked. Each procedure is only invoked
when its use is agreed to by the parties-even
mediation, since the
Conciliator will not submit a proposed agreement for ratification
21 On the other hand, the statements made in conciliation proceedings may not
be published (except with consent of both parties) and the proposed agreement
is not published until it has been accepted or rejected. Thus, the extent to
which public opinion can be mobilised is limited.
22 The so-called " Radical " (Centre) Party has from time to time advocated
The predominant Social
compulsory arbitration of negotiation disputes.
Democratic Party, the D.A. and the L.O. have always hitherto resolutely
opposed " government intervention " in the bargaining process, although the
idea once again is enjoying some currency.
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Contrast this
when one of the parties indicates strong opposition.
diversity of techniques with the North American practice which
generally involves only two: direct bargaining (compulsory in both
Canada and the United States), and conciliation (compulsory in
Canada, voluntary in the United States). No doubt mediation and
arbitration are distasteful to Canadian labour and management as
use under special
but their selective
general propositions,
be examined.23
to
circumstances by private arrangement ought
is
the Danish process
geared to industry-wide
Thirdly,
standards.
determination of labour
Obviously, this avoids ruinous
competition based on wage-cutting that has characterised labour
This creates the
strife, at least in some Canadian industries.24
to
standards
of
particular circumstances
adjusting general
problem
which the Danes have solved by the stratification of negotiations
between the central and sub-organisations, on the basis of general
centralised negotiations
and non-general demands.
Similarly,
to major issues with
confined
be
to
for
disputes
generate pressures
the resultant willingness to sacrifice smaller interests for the general
This tends to leave
good when settlements are in the balance.
localised strife.
to
lead
which
of
dissatisfaction
illegal
may
pockets
On the other hand, centralised bargaining does make it possible
for the strong to help the weak by gaining bargaining demands on
basis that could never be accomplished by
an industry-wide
individual participants.
Finally, the Danes have constructed a rigid time table of
The uniform expiry date of agreements prevents the
negotiations.
" escalator " effect of successive bargaining demands.
The proto
the next
one
from
of
stage
automatically
negotiations
gression
on predetermined dates means that the parties are unable to abuse
the legally established process by delays calculated to obtain
of the
characteristic
(This particular
advantages.
strategic
Canadian conciliation process has received considerable adverse
must be
Both
parties know that agreements
criticism.25)
denounced by February 14, that the agreements expire on March 1,
and that a strike or lockout may then occur, subject only to the
The Basic
Conciliator's limited powers to postpone the stoppage.
23

24

25

The Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, s. 14, provides that
the parties may, by agreement, submit their differences to mediation rather
than conciliation.
Most notably, perhaps, the residential construction industry in Metropolitan
Toronto. See, e.g., Report of the Royal Commission on Labour-Management
Relations in the Construction Industry (Ontario, 1962); cf. Carpenter,
Employers' Associations and Collective Bargaining in New York City (1950),
pp. 373-374.
Woods, " Canadian Collective Bargaining and Disputes Settlement Policy:
An Appraisal " (1955) 21 C.J.E. P.S. 447.
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Agreement provides that collective agreements remain in force,
although denounced, until a work stoppage occurs or new agreements are executed.
This fills a hiatus which would otherwise
exist when, after the expiry of a collective agreement, employees
apparently revert to the common law master-servant relationship.
ADMINISTRATION

OF THE COLLECTIVE

AGREEMENT

The Basic Agreement provides:
" When a collective agreement has been concluded, and for its
duration, no stoppage of work (strike, blockade, lockout, or
boycott) may be effected within the scope of the agreement
unless warranted by the ' Standard Rules for the Settlement of
Labour Disputes ' or by existing
collective
agreements.
strikes
or
lockouts
Sympathetic
sympathetic
may, however, be
effected in accordance with current agreements and legal
practice."
[Section 2 (1).]
This provision is a reflection of a dichotomy drawn in Danish
labour law between " interest " disputes and " legal " disputes.
Interest disputes arise during negotiations, are governed by the
Rules for Negotiation of Agreements above referred to, and contemplate resort to economic self-help.
Legal disputes involve rights
arising from the Basic Agreement or from a collective agreement.
The process of settlement is prescribed by the Standard Rules for
the Settlement of Labour Disputes, by the Basic Agreement, and by
the Labour Court Act. Adjudication of legal disputes is committed
to the Labour Court where a breach of a collective agreement or the
Basic Agreement is alleged, or to Industrial Arbitration where the
As indicated by section 2 (1) of
question is one of interpretation.
the Basic Agreement, work stoppages in legal disputes are only
permitted in the circumstances set forth in the Standard Rules for
The obvious difficulty of drawing
Settlement of Labour Disputes.
a line between interest disputes and legal disputes is best illustrated
by controversies arising during the currency of a collective agreement about matters not expressly provided for therein, e.g., wage
rates for new types of work. Such disputes are generally regarded
as interest disputes, and the right to strike exists unless expressly
waived by agreement.26
By contrast the British reluctance to
" interest "
as
categorise disputes
disputes or " legal " disputes
2G Galenson, p. 244. The American position is similar. By contrast, under
Canadian legislation all strikes during the currency of an agreement are
illegal, although arbitration is only available for questions involving the
interpretation, application, administration or violation of an agreement.
There is no method for adjusting interest disputes during an agreement.
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has precluded the establishment of a system of tribunals to adjudicate at least the latter type.
Economic sanctions (or the threat
are
thus
thereof)
frequently employed to ensure adherence to
collective bargaining obligations.27
The " Standard Rules for the Settlement of Labour Disputes "
were adopted in 1908 by the L.O. and the D.A., and since 1934
have been part of every collective agreement which does not specify
some other adequate provision for Industrial Arbitration.28
By
section 1, the parties " agree to try to settle any trade disputes by
mediation, or, if necessary, by arbitration."
Disputes are committed in the first instance to a Mediation Committee, and, failing
settlement, to negotiations between the two central organisations.
If the dispute involves " the interpretation of an existing pricelist with general conditions or a general [collective] agreement "
between the parties, either party may refer it to arbitration; in
In all
these cases there is no right to engage in work stoppage.
other cases mediation must precede a work stoppage, subject to
three exceptions:
(a) both parties may agree to arbitration;
(b) in cases involving " a suspension of payment " or if " the
regard for life, welfare or honour affords compelling
reasons," there may be a work-stoppage before mediation;
Rules are without prejudice to the right to engage in a
the
(c)
sympathetic work stoppage ordered by the two central
organisations.
The issue of " arbitrability," which turns on the existence of an
agreement, is left to the Labour Court. The Rules provide for the
selection of an ad hoc, tripartite, board of arbitration, familiar in
Canada, where arbitration of such disputes is compulsory, and in
the United States where, though voluntary, arbitration is almost
universal.
There exists, in addition to the ad hoc boards of arbitration, a
permanent arbitral tribunal known as the Contract Board of 1939,
established in that year by agreement between the L.O. and the
D.A. The Board readjusts, semi-annually, the cost-of-living supplement which has been enjoyed by Danish workers since the 1930s.
One of its most important functions, however, is to hear and determine questions arising out of the interpretation of the proposed
collective agreement prepared by the Conciliator, should the parties
27
28

Kahn-Freund, " Labour Law," in Law and Opinion in England (1959), at
p. 232 et seq.
Cf. Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 34 (2), which also provides a standardform arbitration clause in the event that the parties have failed to include
such a clause in their agreement.
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be unable, by negotiation, to agree upon an interpretation.
Since
the Contract Board is charged with the duty of ascertaining the
" intent of the parties " in agreeing to the Conciliator's proposal,
it is perhaps natural that the members of the Board should be the
chief D.A. negotiator, his L.O. counterpart, and the Conciliator.
There is no real distinction between those matters decided by the
Contract Board of 1939 and those decided by arbitration, save that
the former were usually " general " questions at the negotiation
stage, while the latter were " non-general " or local issues, peculiar
to particular trades or enterprises.
Frequently, too, matters which
involve technical knowledge of the industry and its practices are
decided by arbitration.
Several problems which form the hard core of contract adjudicaThe
tion in North America are without counterpart in Denmark.
The
most important of these are seniority and unjust discharge.
absence of disputes on these two issues is easily explained by the
broad management rights clause [section 4 (1)] in the Basic Agreement, acknowledging the " employers' right to direct and distribute
work and to use what labour may in their judgment be suitable,"
"
responsible manner " and to vested
subject only to exercise in a
under
collective
agreements.
rights
There has been no significant union pressure for a seniority
system (to confer a preference in promotion, in lay-offs, and in
rehiring upon senior employees) such as that which North American
On the one hand, employers tend to
unionists prize so highly.
exhibit loyalty to the older worker, partially because he is more
skilled, productive and stable, partially because of the more intimate relationships in the smaller-scale Danish enterprises.
On the
other hand, Denmark's comprehensive and advanced scheme of
welfare services (coupled, recently, with full employment) mitigate
the harsh consequences of the loss of a job.
The treatment of the unjustly discharged employee is a unique
Until
illustration of the Danish attitude towards labour relations.
1960 there was no " due process of law " for the discharged
employee. The occasional irresponsible acts of individual employers
in discharging employees without cause tended to provoke retaliaIn revising
tory wildcat strikes (which were, of course, illegal).
the Basic Agreement in November 1960 the D.A. agreed to a
restriction on the broad management rights clause by the insertion
of a proviso that " the right to dismiss individual workers . . . not
be exercised in an arbitrary manner " [section 4 (3)]. A procedure
for local (and then central) negotiations in the case of alleged unjust
dismissals was established, culminating in adjudication by a permanent, tripartite Board. The Board is empowered to compensate,
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but not to reinstate, the unjustly discharged employee, the unions
having acknowledged that the continued presence of the discharged
employee in the plant would constitute an ongoing challenge to the
authority of the employer.29
Thus both sides have realised that unfettered employer discretion may create industrial friction, and by contract have agreed to
a moderate restatement of that discretion, neither side pressing for
complete control.
In one area of collective agreement administration-displacement caused by technological change-the Danes have since 1947
faced up to a problem which awaits institutional recognition by
North American labour. The basic commitment of both parties
to increased productivity and efficiency flows from section 9 of the
Basic Agreement. In 1947, the L.O. and the D.A. agreed to establish in each enterprise a joint Works Committee, representing both
labour and management whose functions are defined as follows
[section 5] :
(a) With a view to furthering production the committee
shall deal with all matters relating to rational operation,
including such questions as the technical equipment, the planning of the work, economy as regards materials, etc., the aim
being organisation of the working process so as to increase the
productivity to the widest possible extent in order to reduce
the cost of production, to bring about lower prices, and to
benefit the undertaking, the persons employed in the undertaking and the community as a whole.
The committee shall also promote the vocational training
within the undertaking.
(b) For the purpose of creating the best possible conditions
of work, thus promoting job-complacency, the committee shall
deal with questions of welfare, safety, health, employment
security, etc.
If reductions or reorganisation of the working of the undertaking are contemplated, the committee shall as early as possible deal with the matter in order to make the change as easy
as possible for the workers concerned.
(c) In order to encourage the workers' interest in the operation of the undertaking it shall be the duty of the employer
to provide the committee with such information about the
economic conditions of the undertaking and its position within
the trade as is of importance for the conditions of production
29 Most North American arbitrators take the view that their jurisdiction extends
so far as to enable them to order the reinstatement in employment of an
unjustly discharged employee.
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and the possibilities of sale in general. Information about the
accounts shall be given to the same extent as is normally given
to shareholders through the accounts submitted at the annual
general meeting of the company. There shall be no obligation
to supply information that may be used to the detriment of the
undertaking, or information about personal matters.
The Committee has no power to affect in any way the negotiation, interpretation, or termination of collective agreements, and
acts entirely by consultation and negotiation. Meetings are held
after working hours, but the employer pays the employees an hourly
rate for attendance. The Committee is empowered to obtain all
relevant information, including confidential management communications, which might affect the company's competitive and collective bargaining position were the Committee members not sworn to
secrecy.
The technique of the most successful Works Committees has
been to prevent dislocation where possible, by means of a transition
period during which redundant employees can be relocated either
within or outside the enterprise. At the same time, employee support for innovations is secured by inviting employee suggestions
and by making employees feel that they are part of the decisionmaking process. Unfortunately, the Works Committee system has
not met with universal favour amongst either employers or
unionists, despite an active educational campaign by both central
organisations. To date, a high level of employment has meant that
technologically displaced workers could be easily employed elsewhere, and the system has remained relatively untested.
THE LABOUR COURT

At the centre of the network of specialised tribunals which deals
with legal disputes is the Labour Court. It was conceived in the
provisions of the September Agreement of 1899 as a private Court
of Arbitration, and re-established on its present statutory base in
1910 at the joint request of the L.O. and D.A. The Court is composed of six regular partisan members and sixteen deputies (of
whom half are nominees of the L.O. and half of the D.A.), appointed for two-year terms. A neutral president and three vicepresidents are elected annually by the partisan members and
(together with at least one regular and two deputy members from
each side) must possess the legal qualifications for judicial appointment. Indeed, the neutral members of the Court are inevitably
drawn from the judiciary, who are statutorily bound to accept
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appointment."3 The requirement that the partisan members elect
the neutrals annually is in deliberate contrast to the general Danish
tradition of life tenure for judges. It is premised on the belief that
the annual election assures a moral commitment of the parties to
the decisions of their neutral arbiters. In fact only once has a
neutral failed of re-election because one of the central organisations
chose to wreak vengeance for an adverse decision.31
The jurisdiction of the Court is set*forth in section 4 of the Act,
and parallels the commitments to the Court's jurisdiction contained
in the various private arrangements made by the parties. The
Court may adjudicate:
(1) breaches of the Basic Agreement,
(2) breaches of any agreement between a union and an employers' association or an individual (unaffiliated) employer,
except in so far as the parties may by agreement specifically
oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court,
(3) the legality of any work stoppage, or the adequacy of the
notice thereof (including stoppages in violation of existing
agreements, or of arbitration awards, or of awards of the
Labour Court), and
(4) on consent, other matters of dispute between employers and
workers provided it is founded upon some contractual
arrangement.
Proceedings are nominally instituted by or against the central
organisation (if any) to which the plaintiff or defendant belongs.
However, a central organisation will only assume legal liability
where it has been party to the offence or where it has contracted
to do so. Individual unaffiliated employers may sue and defend
in their own right, but the individual unorganised worker has no
status before the Court and must resort to his common law remedies
in the regular courts.
The statistics 32 of the Court's operations reveal the effect of the
pre-eminent position of the L.O. and D.A. Approximately twothirds of all cases were brought by the L.O. as plaintiff. Of the
one-third of employer-plaintiff cases, the D.A. brought about 80
per cent. (although it represents a much lower percentage of
employers), the balance being brought by unaffiliated employers.
In an interesting contrast to a current Canadian controversy over a proposal
to remove county court judges from labour arbitration, the Labour Court Act
directs that if a judge's Labour Court duties interfere with his regular duties,
he is to be relieved of the latter, not the former.
31s Galenson, p. 212. The Labour Court Act provides for appointment of the
neutrals by the Chief Justice of the Copenhagen courts, and his colleagues,
in the event that the partisan members are unable to agree.
32 See Galenson, c. 10.
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Generally speaking, the employer as plaintiff is more often successful than the union as plaintiff.
From these facts, several
conclusions may be drawn: the L.O. has commenced many cases
because it is " politically " unable to refuse its affiliates, with the
consequent likelihood of a larger proportion of weak cases; most of
the D.A. cases are subject to a filtering by D.A. staff lawyers, and
are more likely to have merit; many of the union-plaintiff cases
involve the policing of agreements with unaffiliated employers, as
appears from the fact that the D.A. is party to barely one-half of
the cases before the Court. In sum it does seem clear that, within
their constitutional limitations, the central organisations control the
Court's business, keep the volume of business within manageable
limits, and tend to avoid weak and unimportant cases.
The Labour Court's procedures also tend to channel its energies
towards the decision of important and difficult cases. Cases are
initiated by complaint, notice is given to the respondent, and the
The
matter set down for preliminary hearing before the president.
purpose of this hearing is " to facilitate mediation between the
parties or ... to obtain further information . .. by way of preparaSome 20 per cent. of all cases are withdrawn
tion for the hearing."
before the preliminary hearing, 45 per cent. are withdrawn after35 per cent. result in a final
wards, and only approximately
judgment.33 The form of the preliminary hearing obviously conThe hearing (usually held on Friday afterduces to settlement.
noon) is conducted in the presence of the president, the parties and
counsel. No witnesses are called, but the parties each state their
The president then " explains " the law to the parties
position.
and may make it clear to them that the matter ought not to be
This device is especially desirable for the L.O. as it
pursued.
a
ground upon which a hopeless case, prosecuted because
provides
of internal " political " pressures, can be dropped. The informality
of the hearing also enables the parties to " let off steam," after
which they may be content to terminate the matter.
Failing settlement, the case comes on for formal hearing the
next morning.
Proceedings are held in camera, the parties are
and may, of course, call evidence.
represented by counsel34
the
after
hearing, without any preliminary caucuses,
Immediately
the partisan judges are polled (plaintiff first) and the presiding
The figures are taken from Galenson, supra, note 32. D.A. statistics indicate
that only some 20 per cent. of their recent cases result in final judgment, the
balance being withdrawn either before or after the preliminary hearing.
34 The L.O. does not employ legally-trained counsel, although their representative
is apparently intelligent and vigorous. This traditional labour suspicion of
lawyers may be somewhat obsolescent, as the Vice-President of the L.O., in
his 1961 birthday speech, stated his " birthday wish " to be the recruiting for
L.O. service of more professional people, including lawyers.
33
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judge votes last. He will then prepare a draft judgment which will
be discussed at a later meeting of the Court, and will ultimately be
delivered to the parties as the unanimous decision of the Court.
The partisan judges are thus able to assist the neutrals by frank
discussion in conference, but do not derogate from the authority
of their decision by refusing to subscribe to it.
Cases may be withdrawn at any time before final judgment, a
consideration of importance to a party faced with the likely prospect of creating an adverse precedent. The Court of its own motion
may remit any appropriate case to arbitration (especially where
some technical, factual question is involved) or to the Contract
Board of 1939, with or without reserving to itself power of final
disposition. In its judgment, the Court usually awards costs against
the losing party, although in close cases the costs may be evenly
divided.
Subject to these considerations, it delivers judgment in
the familiar fashion of any Court.
Aside from
What is unique, however, is the remedy employed.
its power to order the payment of money where failure to pay is the
basis of the proceeding, the primary remedy is the fine. The
measure of the fine is determined both by penal and compensatory
considerations, as the fine is paid over to the aggrieved party.
Thus the Court considers the actual loss incurred, the existence of
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and the seriousness of
the offence. Aggravating circumstances may include a refusal to
submit to arbitration, or to obey an award of the Court or of an
circumstances
arbitration board.
usually involve
Extenuating
some provocative or unjust act of the plaintiff, and the bona fides
The discretionary fine was originally adopted at
of the defendant.
the suggestion of the unions, and has proved to be an effective
Not the least
device for enforcing adherence to legal obligations.
it
is
fact
that
is
the
reason for its effectiveness
inevitably collected.
are
levied upon in the
or
unions
Fines awarded against
employers
35
awarded against
Fines
as
same manner
any legal judgment.
for
individual employees (usually
striking illegally) are calculated
and
then are withheld from the
to
of
terms
in
pay,
ability
he
should
If
change jobs, his new employer is
employee's salary.
if he becomes unemployed, his
the
make
to
deduction;
required
The employer is forbidden to
assets are seized in satisfaction.
of
as
a
fine
the
peace, and the D.A. polices
buying
technique
forgive
its own members strictly to ensure that all fines are collected.
One substantive problem which has given the Court difficulty is
In
the vicarious liability of a union for the acts of its members.
35 A local union may be put into bankruptcy, and its successor nonetheless
continues to be liable for the fine.
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the case of illegal strikes, any form of union endorsation will invoke
liability, as will a failure to take all possible steps to end the strike
(including withholding strike pay, and assisting the employer in
finding replacements). On the other hand, liability will almost
always fall upon the local union with its limited assets, rather than
upon the national.
The remedy employed by the Labour Court, like so much of
Danish labour law, represents a quid pro quo: in return for an
effective remedy for employers the unions obtain a cheap, quick and
expert forum in which they may pursue their legal rights. The
parties are obviously satisfied with the operation of the Labour Court
which is, after all, a tribunal of their own making. Section 5B
(1) of the Labour Court Act provides: " where there exists a right
to take proceedings before the Labour Court proceedings before an
ordinary court of law are prohibited.

..

."

Neither the L.O. nor

the D.A. have attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the Labour
Court, despite the existence in Danish law of procedures analogous
to the prerogative writ procedures in the common law. Even
Labour Court decisions defining its own jurisdiction have gone
unchallenged. In questioning the parties on this point, I received
the answer: " Why should we, for the sake of a victory in a
particular case, seek to destroy a useful and important institution
which we have built ourselves ? " This forbearance from the full
use of all legal weapons is in sharp contrast to the common North
American attitude that every proceeding is a tactical manoeuvre
designed not merely to protect legal rights, but to bludgeon the
opposite party into submission. The Danish attitude is demonstrated in many ways: a reluctance to frame proceedings in
common law terms so as to invoke the strict tort doctrines
employed by the regular courts; the refusal of the D.A. to support
actions by individual anti-union workmen; above all, a willingness
to accept legal defeat as " fortunes of war." The net effect is that
virtually the whole body of Danish labour law is found in the
decisions of the Labour Court and that the Court's prestige stands
high amongst management and labour, professionals and laymen,
alike.
The only current criticism of the Court, one which ought not
permanently to impair its prestige, stems from its increasing preoccupation with illegal strikes. In the past few years, largely
because of a general inflationary trend, there have been several
instances of local " wildcat " strikes. This fact coupled with
increased employer adherence to legal obligations and a firm Court
policy of remitting cases to arbitration where possible has meant
that a disproportionately high number of the Court's decisions in
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recent years have involved fines for illegal strikers. Whether this
trend will lead workers to adopt an image of the Court as an
oppressor remains to be seen.
There does not appear to be extensive criticism indicating a
trend towards excessive " legalism " in the Court's decisionmaking. The requirement that the neutrals and some of the
partisan members possess legal qualifications is counter-balanced by
the practice of the Court in so constituting the hearing panel as to
include partisan members with knowledge of the industry involved.
Decisions of the Court are generally handed down within two weeks
after hearing, seldom more than three months, and in crisis situations (such as illegal strikes) within a day or two. The Court
conducts its hearing with a minimum of formalism, and the role
of the judge is more active than is customary in our tradition.
Precedent has persuasive weight, and the citation of decided cases
might be thought to favour trained D.A. lawyers over untrained
L.O. representatives. But although labour from time to time has
"
vaguely suggested that the Court ought not to dispense " law
but " justice," the current L.O. representative (not himself a
lawyer) seemed quite prepared to pursue the present practice of
reliance upon decided cases.
THE

SUBSTANTIVE

LAW

OF INDUSTRIAL

WARFARE

The regular courts, as well as the parties, have chosen to regard the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court as exclusive. Thus, cases with a
" double aspect " involving a breach of an agreement coming
within the Labour Court's jurisdiction, as well as violation of a
common law right, have been remitted to the Labour Court. The
cases in which the regular courts have been free to develop their
jurisprudence have been few in recent years, and largely confined
to actions by unorganised workers or unaffiliated employers against
unions.
Employers in Denmark have traditionally refrained from widespread use of the blacklist, the " yellow-dog " contract or the
" document " (as it is known in Britain), and of strikebreakers, at
least since the September Agreement of 1899. All of these tactics
are particularly adaptable for " union-busting " campaigns which
are not within the ethos of Danish labour relations. On the other
hand, the lockout (both primary and sympathetic) is a recognised
bargaining device employed to prevent unions from breaking a wage
standard by concentrating pressure on weak employers. Occasionally the lockout does set off a chain-reaction of strike-counter
lockout-counter strike with the result that minor disputes achieve
major proportions. The propriety of economic strikes and lockouts
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has been largely determined by the Basic Agreement, and breaches
are not litigated in the regular courts.
Picketing is usually unnecessary, since the mere announcement
of a strike in the press usually suffices to bring out the work force.
Information on picketing designed to advise workers of a dispute is
lawful, but that which is intended to procure a customer boycott
is unlawful on the theory that the employer's public reputation is
permanently damaged. On the same theory, publication of the
names of workers who refuse to cease work is forbidden. Danish
law recognises a cause of action for the deliberate interference with
the rights of another, which is occasionally employed where the
union was held to be seeking some improper objective, not related
to its normal interests. Organisational strikes are lawful, but (at
least in those enterprises affiliated with the D.A.) pressure to compel
the closed or union shop is unlawful. There is some case law
forbidding union pressure on the employer to discharge non-union
employees, but this objective is usually achieved by social ostracism
rather than by resort to economic force. In the case of employers
not affiliated with the D.A., the closed shop is a lawful labour
objective, but unions are compelled to allow non-members to join.
Consumer boycotts of employers engaged in a labour dispute have
been held to be an unlawful attempt to broaden the range of
economic sanctions.
One can only conclude that the Danish common law doctrines
are not dissimilar to our own, but that they are seldom invoked
because the parties, realising the inherent limitations of the ordinary
judicial processes, have chosen instead self-made and selfadministered regulation. This approach to the legal regulation of
economic warfare stems from a position not unlike that which
Professor Kahn-Freund describes as characteristic of British industrial relations-" collective laissez-faire." 36 Concurred in by the
legislature and the courts, it has resulted in an atmosphere of willing
acceptance which legislative compulsion has precluded in the United
States, and in the consistent and expert analysis of legal problems
which is impossible in Canada where common law tort doctrines
survive anachronistically in an era of compulsory collective
bargaining.
Jurisdictional inter-union disputes 37 are settled intramurally by
the L.O., the D.A. having early declined to participate in joint procedures for several reasons: an unwillingness to shoulder a thankless task; a refusal to allow, by implication, monopolistic craft
claims; a fear of inhibiting new patterns of industrial development.
36 See Kahn-Freund, op. cit., supra, note 27 at p. 224.
:37 See Galenson, p. 63 et seq.
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Surprisingly, jurisdictional disputes have not proved to be as much
of a problem in Denmark as a North American might anticipate,
keeping in mind the number of small, entrenched craft unions
whose patterns of organisation antedate industrialisation. The
L.O.'s jurisdictional dispute procedures follow the usual Danish
pattern of private consultation between the rival parties, followed
by an attempt at third-party conciliation, and culminating in
private, tri-partite adjudication. The L.O.'s jurisdictional disputes
tribunal is composed of two L.O. nominees, a nominee of each of
the rival unions, and a chairman (who is a judge). Adjudication
is seldom invoked today, however, because of the success of the
system in establishing lines of demarcation in the past, and in
achieving agreement between the parties. The tribunal, as a
matter of substantive law, relies heavily upon established practices
and its own precedents, allowing for the desires of employees,
comparative wage rates, and the status quo, in marginal cases.
The significant fact to be noted is, however, the substitution in
Denmark of private legal processes for economic self-help, or public
adjudication.38
LAW REFORM

Since 1908, the Danes have engaged in continual review and
refinement of both their public and private legal arrangements in
matters relating to labour relations.
The current law reform agency is the Labour Law Commission
whose membership comprises representatives of the L.O., the D.A.,
of other employee and employer groups, the president of the Labour
Court, the Chairman of the Conciliation Agency, representatives of
the Ministry of Labour, and members of parliament representing
the major parties. The reforms implemented in 1957-60 as a result
of the work of the Commission involved revision of the September
Agreement of 1899, the Standard Rules for Negotiation of Collective
Agreements, and the Conciliation Act.
Once again, the mixed private and public nature of the Danish
system becomes apparent, with primary emphasis focused on the
consensus of the L.O. and D.A. as a condition precedent to
lawmaking.
North American legislators might be well advised to consider
38 The Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 66, represents a pioneering effort in
public adjudication of jurisdictional disputes in Canada. In the United States,
since 1949, there has been an experiment in private adjudication by the
National Joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry. See Crispo and Arthurs, " Jurisdictional Disputes in
Canada: A Study in Frustration," (1963) 3 Current Law and Social Problems
(Univ.West.Ont.).
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establishment of a similar institution which, apart from its obvious
function of ongoing law reform, provides a forum for the amicable
interchange of views between labour, management and government.
CONCLUSION:

LABOUR LORE AND LABOUR LAW

This, then, is a synopsis of the Danish system of industrial relations
which is conceded generally to be one of the most effective and
sophisticated in the world.
To say that the Danes have " solved " labour relations is to
overstate the case by far. In 1960, for example, a rash of wildcat
strikes occurred, largely as a result of the dissatisfaction of workers
who felt that their interests had been submerged in the voting in
the preceding general negotiations. But if this disruption revealed
one of the danger-spots in the Danish system-bloc voting-its
aftermath is equally instructive. Some employers sought to buy
peace by granting wage increases, which resulted in the imposition
of sanctions by the D.A., for breach of its rules requiring employer
solidarity. On the other side, the L.O., realising the illegality of
the conduct of the strikers, settled virtually all cases in which the
remedies of the Labour Court were sought. In the 1961 negotiations, again, certain structural weaknesses emerged which ultimately required parliamentary intervention to impose a settlement
in the transportation industry. No doubt the system will encounter
crises in the future as it has in the past. But the relevance for
North Americans of the Danish system is not so much its present
performance as its demonstrated long-run ability to contain conflict
by an imaginative use of institutional devices.
By way of recapitulation, these institutional devices can be
grouped under three headings: First, centralised industry-wide
bargaining conducted by professionals in accordance with agreedupon and firm procedural rules. Secondly, private law-making with
its implicit commitment by both parties to abide by the law.
Thirdly, private processes of adjudication and dispute-settlement
in a variety of forums tailor-made for various types of conflicts.
Sceptics, and indeed realists, will properly point out that the
Danish system is the result of historical, social and economic forces
which have produced a labour lore which is uniquely Danish.
Undoubtedly the September Agreement of 1899 was possible
because of an existing acceptance of employer *and employee
organisation which had no parallel in North America. Undoubtedly, too, the September Agreement in turn created an atmosphere
in which labour-management adjustments through private lawmaking were facilitated. Thus, over the years, the parties have
accumulated a fund of mutual trust and respect upon which they
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may draw in moments of conflict. There can be no doubt that the
lore evokes the law, and that in turn the law generates lore. But
to conclude that North Americans are by fate debarred from profiting from the Danish experience is to be hypnotised by the
chicken-egg conundrum.
If the Danes can teach us no other lesson, they can teach us
this: it is possible, beginning from a crisis situation, to build upon
the mutual interdependence of labour and management a legal
institutional framework capable of accommodating the opposing
interests-given only a will to do so."9
APPENDIX

ONE

THE MAIN AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 18, 1960, BETWEEN THE DANISH
EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATION AND THE DANISH
FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONs

Section 1
Subsection 1. In recognition of the desirability of having questions concerning
wages and working conditions settled by the conclusion of collective agreements, if necessary with the participation of the central organisations, the
central organisations and their members bind themselves neither directly nor
indirectly to obstruct employers and workers from organising themselves
within the organisational framework of the central organisations.
Subsection 2. By a collective agreement is understood (cf. The Permanent
Court of Arbitration Act, sections 4B and 17) an agreement concerning
wages and working conditions between a workers' organisation on the one
hand and either an employers' organisation or an individual employer (firm)
on the other.
Section 2
Subsection 1. When a collective agreement has been concluded, and for its
duration, no stoppage of work (strike, blockade, lockout or boycott) may be
effected within the scope of the agreement unless warranted by the Standard
Rules for the Settlement of Labour Disputes or by existing collective agreements. Sympathetic strikes or sympathetic lockouts may, however, be effected
in accordance with current agreements and legal practice.
Subsection 2. Disputes as to whether an agreement exists or concerning the
scope of the agreement shall be settled by industrial arbitration.
Subsection 3. No stoppage of work may lawfully be effected unless approved
by at least three-quarters of the votes cast by a body competent according
to the statutes of the organisation in question and unless notice has been
served in accordance with the provisions of subsection 4. The only exceptions
to this rule are the cases of stoppage of work mentioned in the Standard
Rules, section 5, subsection 2.
Subsection 4. The intent to submit a proposal of stoppage of work of such
a body shall be brought to the attention of the Executive Committee of the
other central organisation in writing and by registered mail at least fourteen
39

Indeed, there is evidence of widespread interest in Canada, at least, in the
Scandinavian industrial relations systems. See, e.g., Report of Fact-Finding
Body re Labour Legislation (Province of Nova Scotia, 1962) at p. 27:
" We feel that there is much in the Swedish plan that should recommend
it to management-labour bodies in Nova Scotia and elsewhere in
Canada. ...
We suggest, therefore, that representatives of management
and labour in Nova Scotia undertake an exhaustive study of the Swedish
plan . . .

JAN. 1963]

Labour Lore and Labour Law

275

days before the proposed stoppage of work is to take effect and the decision
of the body shall in the same way be made known to the other party at least
seven days before the stoppage of work is to begin.
Subsection 5. The two central organisations as well as their affiliated
organisations shall be bound not to support, but by all reasonable means to
prevent, unlawful stoppages of work and, if an unlawful stoppage of work
should take place, to attempt to have it brought to a conclusion.
Subsection 6. A strike or lockout is considered to exist if a workshop or
other place of work is systematically being evacuated or gradually closed
down as part of a labour dispute.
Subsection 7. During a labour dispute between the parties to the present
agreement or their members and unaffiliated workers' or employers' organisations or individual undertakings, no support may be given to the unaffiliated
organisation or undertaking by any party bound by this agreement. An
organisation or undertaking joining one of the central organisations or an
association organised by them shall not be regarded as unaffiliated, provided
that no stoppage of work was taking place at the time of application for
membership or that such stoppage had not been clearly announced after
unsuccessful negotiations.
Section 3
The central organisations shall be responsible for ensuring that agreements
concluded between them are respected and carried out by all affiliated
organisations.
Section 4
Subsection 1. The parties agree that the employers' right to direct and
distribute work and to use what labour may in their judgment be suitable
shall, with regard to the workers, be exercised in a responsible manner and
in such a way as not to violate their rights under existing agreements.
Subsection 2. In the case where labour has been engaged for a specified
piece work without any reservation, the working conditions may not be
changed unless the employer concerned compensates the workers for any
financial loss resulting from the change. Disputes in this respect shall be
settled by customary procedure (joint meeting, mediation or arbitration).
Subsection 3. The right to dismiss individual workers must not be exercised
in an arbitrary manner and complaints of alleged unreasonable dismissals
shall therefore be dealt with according to the following rules:
(a) In the case of the dismissal of a worker who has reached the age of
20 and has been continually employed at the undertaking concerned for at
least one year, the worker in question is entitled to demand information about
the cause of his dismissal.
(b) If it is claimed by a worker or his organisation that the dismissal is
unreasonable and not founded on circumstances connected with the worker
or the undertaking, a local discussion of the dismissal between representatives
of the management and of the workers of the undertaking may be demanded.
(c) If no agreement is reached at the local discussion and the national
union (or association of unions) concerned insists on the continuation of the
case, the organisations shall immediately initiate negotiations.
(d) If such negotiations are unsuccessful, the national union (or association of unions) interested in the case shall, within fifteen days of the
negotiations between the organisations, have the right to demand that the
case be considered by a permanent board set up by the central organisations.
This board is to consist of two representatives selected by each of the central
organisations and a chairman and umpire selected by the central organisations
from among the members of the Supreme Court. If agreement about the
selection cannot be arrived at, the umpire shall be designated by the President
of the Supreme Court. The appointments shall be valid for three calendar
years at a time and two substitutes shall be appointed for each of the four
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board members. Before considering a case, the board shall be joined by a
representative from each of the two agreement parties directly involved. No
board member may have any direct connection with the management or the
workers of the undertaking whose case is being considered.
(e) The board shall hand down a reasoned decision, and in the cases where
the board finds the dismissal in question to be unreasonable and not founded
on circumstances relating to the worker or the undertaking, the board may
decide that the employer shall pay to the dismissed worker a compensation,
the amount of which shall depend on the particulars of the case and on the
seniority of the improperly dismissed worker, but which cannot exceed
thirteen weeks' wages calculated on the basis of the average earnings of the
dismissed worker during the preceding year.
Section 5
Subsection 1. Supervisors, foremen, and persons in corresponding positions
who represent the employer in relation to the workers, may be required by
the employer, after consultation with the person in question, not to become
a member of any workers' organisation.
Subsection 2. The right conferred on the employer by subsection 1 cannot be
asserted merely because a worker is engaged as a salaried employee, if otherwise he does not fulfil the requirements for being recognised as a foreman
in the sense of the Main Agreement.
Subsection 3. The interested supervisors' organisations should be permitted
to be represented at meetings held to deal with disagreements about the above
provisions.
Section 6
The parties will oppose possible attempts to keep persons out of workers'
organisations on the plea of partnership agreements which do not make the
persons in question real partners in the firm.
Section 7
Subsection 1. The period of notice to terminate agreements concerning price
lists and other working conditions shall be three months, unless otherwise
agreed.
Subsection 2. Even if an agreement has been denounced or has expired, the
parties shall, nevertheless, be bound to comply with its provisions until
another agreement has taken its place or stoppage of work has been effected
in accordance with the rules of section 2.
Section 8
The central organisations agree that shop steward rules should be inserted
in the collective agreements whenever the character of the working conditions
makes it practical.
Section 9
Subsection 1. The two central organisations will promote co-operation among
the organisations and work for peaceful and stable working conditions in the
undertakings through joint industrial committees or other suitable bodies.
Subsection 2. Collective agreements should aim at wage systems which will
promote productivity and in addition give the workers an opportunity for
higher earnings than ordinary time rates, because normally, when it is
possible to have a job done both as piece work and as work paid by ordinary
time rates, a greater amount of work and thereby higher earnings can be
expected by piece work rates than by ordinary time rates.
Subsection 3. No party may prevent a worker from doing as much and as
good work as his abilities and training permit.
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Section 10
In the case of an alleged breach of this Main Agreement as well as in the
case of an alleged breach of any other collective agreement entered into by
the central organisations or their members, a joint meeting shall be held with
the co-operation of the central organisations before a complaint is brought
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Section 11
The unions, associations and industrial undertakings affiliated with the
two central organisations cannot, by resigning from the central organisations,
release themselves from the obligations which they have accepted under the
present Main Agreement. They continue to apply until this Main Agreement
is denounced by either of the central organisations.
Section 19
Subsection 1. This Main Agreement shall remain in force until it is denounced
by a notice of six months to terminate on October 1 of any year, although not
earlier than October 1, 1966. The central organisation that might desire to
amend the Main Agreement shall inform the opposite party to that effect,
six months prior to the denunciation, after which negotiations shall be commenced with the purpose of reaching agreement and thereby avoiding
denunciation of the Main Agreement.
Subsection 2. If, after denunciation has been made, negotiations regarding
a renewal of the Main Agreement have not been concluded by the October 1
in question, the Main Agreement shall remain in force although the time of
denunciation has expired, until the collective agreements in force have been
replaced by new ones. The Main Agreement shall cease to apply when the
new collective agreements come into force.
Section 13
This Main Agreement, which replaces the Agreement of September 5,
1899, will take effect simultaneously with the renewal of the agreements now
in force.
APPENDIX

TWO

RULES FOR NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS
AGI1EEIMENTBETWEEN THE DANISH EMPLOYERS' CONFEDERATIONAND THE
NATIONAL CONFEDERATIONOF DANISH TRADE UNIONS, DATEDMAY 11, 1960

Section 1
covered
All
the
fields
by agreements and comprising organisations and
(1)
undertakings affiliated to the two central organisations shall be divided into
eight groups, viz.:
(i) metal trades;
(ii) textile and clothing industries;
(iii) food and drinks, and allied industries;
(iv) other industries, including the woodwork industry;
(v) building and construction;
(vi) graphic industries, including the paper article and cardboard box
industries;
(vii) transport;
(viii) employees in commerce and offices.
(2) Any disagreements about the placing of the individual agreements in
the groups shall be decided by a Board appointed by the central
organisations.
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(3) Negotiation of agreements within these groups shall, as hitherto, be
carried on within each particular field: Provided that the central organisations would recommend that the trades covered by the individual groups
consult together about the progress of negotiations and make efforts to
provide co-ordination to the widest possible extent.
Section 2
All agreements shall have the same date of expiration, viz., March 1.
Section 3
In order that the period of negotiation may be used to the best advantage
for objective negotiations between the parties, the following rules shall
apply :
(1) The party wanting an existing agreement to be revised shall before
November 1 of the year preceding expiration of agreements submit complete
proposals for such revision.
(2) Subject to the provision of section 6, where no proposal for revision
is submitted by any of the parties, the agreement shall remain in force as it
stands.
between the suborganisations
shall be commenced
(3) Negotiations
immediately on receipt of the proposals for revision. The negotiations shall
be carried on intensively and be brought to a conclusion not later than
December 1.
(4) If the negotiations lead to a result that is accepted by both parties,
the agreements concerned have thereby been brought to a final conclusion.
The results achieved shall be without prejudice to any other results.
(5) In the negotiations between the suborganisations as well as with the
co-operation of the central organisations, either party (central organisation)
may request the co-operation of a subconciliator in the negotiations, and
this may take place already from the commencement of negotiations.
(6) If by December 1 no agreement has been reached between the
negotiation committees of the suborganisations about new agreements, the
matters at issue shall pass immediately to the central organisations for
consideration.
Section 4
Immediately on conclusion of negotiations between the suborganisations
both parties shall be bound to submit a detailed and precise report to their
respective central organisations giving information on
(a) the agreements hitherto in force;
(b) any questions on which agreement may have been reached;
(c) any questions still outstanding, with indication of any proposals and
other documents exchanged between the parties.
Section 5
(1) To deal with the remaining disagreements with a particular view to
consideration of the general questions, the central organisations shall each
appoint a negotiation committee to be composed of six representatives.
committees of the central organisations
shall
(2) The negotiation
immediately after December 1 commence negotiations on the general questions
and any other questions that may be selected by the negotiation committees.
(3) By general questions shall be understood such as may be likely to be
relevant to all or the majority of the fields covered by agreements, such as
demands relating to hours of work, changes in rates of wages, changes in
rules governing the annual holiday with pay and governing holidays other
than Sundays, social amenities, and questions about the duration of
agreements.
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(4) Other questions that may be taken up by the negotiation committees
shall be such as are of the same nature as the general questions referred to
above but which have been raised only within one or more of the groups set
out in section 1.
(5) Besides, the negotiation committees of the central organisations shall
decide which of the demands put forward may be regarded as general, and
what other questions shall be considered by the negotiation committees.
(6) Any disagreements about the rules laid down above shall be decided
by the Agreement Board [of 1939, Ed.].
(7) If these negotiations conclude in a result that is accepted by both
parties, that result shall form part of the proposals for new agreements
between the parties in the eight groups set out in section 1.
Section 6
(1) If during the negotiations between the central organisations or with
the co-operation of the conciliator agreement is reached on one or more of
the general questions, the result shall apply to the entire field covered by
the Confederation of Danish Trade Unions and the Danish Employers'
Confederation, unless the nature of the agreement or the preceding negotiations militate against it, or if agreement has been reached during negotiations
between the suborganisations also in respect of the general questions.
(2) The intention is to avoid unreasonable or unfair results; in cases of
doubt, the matter may be decided by the Agreement Board. The case shall
be submitted through one of the central organisations.
Section 7
(1) If the negotiations on the general demands between the negotiation
committees of the central organisations have led to no result by December 20,
the Conciliation Board shall be requested to join the committee, on the one
hand to be informed of the attitude of the parties and, on the other, to
preside over the negotiations, which shall be expedited as much as possible
in order that a result may be achieved by January 20.
(2) With a view to the best possible utilisation of the period of negotiation,
the Conciliation Board shall be requested to commence work immediately in
the case of any outstanding issues after January 20.
Section 8
with
the
between the negotiation committees of
negotiations
Concurrently
the central organisations on the general questions, negotiations on the remaining questions shall be continued under the chairmanship of the central
If agreement is reached, the result shall stand over till the
organisations.
subsequent joint voting in the groups [cf. subsection (2) of section 11].
Section 9
(1) Provided agreement cannot be reached on the remaining matters at
issue during the negotiations carried on under the chairmanship of the
central organisations, the parties may, on conclusion of the negotiations,
decide that the remaining disagreements on non-general questions shall be
considered, wholly or in part, by a joint committee [cf. section 10]. The
demands on which agreement for consideration by a joint committee cannot
be reached shall be referred to the Conciliation Board.
(2) Following consultation with the central organisations the Conciliation
Board shall decide whether the issues shall be subject to direct conciliation
by the Conciliation Board, possibly through subconciliators, or be referred for
final decision by the joint committee [cf. section 10].
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Section 10
(1) The joint committees which accordingly shall deal with questions of a
non-general nature shall be composed of one representative of each of the
two central organisations, one representative of each side of the group
concerned [cf. section 1] and one representative of each of the parties to
the agreement. It shall be the business of the joint committee to mediate
between the parties and, in the case of a majority of the members of the
committee being in favour hereof, it may decide the question with binding
effect on both parties. Any questions which do not get a majority of the
members of the committee shall be decided by an umpire appointed by the
committee.
Where agreement cannot be reached on appointment of an
umpire, such appointment shall be left to the Conciliation Board.
(2) In the course of their deliberations for determining the fair price for
the work in question, the joint committee may, for purposes of information,
require all particulars on conditions of work, prices, wages and piece-work
earning in the particular trade. Where local price-lists are concerned, due
regard shall be had to the local conditions prevailing.
(3) The joint committee or the umpire shall not be entitled to decide any
questions of a general nature [cf. section 5]. Any disagreements as to
whether a demand is of such nature shall be decided by the Agreement
Board.
(4) Any questions being subject to consideration and decision under the
above rules shall as far as possible have been considered and decided by the
date when new agreements shall come into force, unless the parties agree to
postpone the decision till after conclusion of the negotiation of agreements.
Section 11
the
Each
of
eight groups shall decide, by group, on the attitude to
(1)
adopt to any final drafts for renewal of agreements. In voting, the individual
group cannot be linked with others; within each particular group the rules
shall be the same as in the Conciliation (Labour Disputes) Act.
(2) The joint group voting shall cover fields for which agreements are
concluded subsequent to December 1, irrespective of the date of voting.
(3) The joint group voting shall not cover fields in which the parties
have concluded agreements by themselves prior to December 1 [cf. subsections
(3) and (4) of section 3].
Section 12
In the case of any voting on draft agreements being the result of direct
negotiation, the rules of voting shall be the same as in the Conciliation
(Labour Disputes) Act.
Section 13
If the negotiations with or without the co-operation of the conciliator fail
to provide agreement on the demands put forward, either party shall be
entitled to give notice of their intention to effect a stoppage of work as from
the date of expiration of the agreements; similarly, a sympathetic conflict
may be instituted under the provisions of labour law.
Section 14
(1) The last date of due denunciation of agreements shall be February 14.
(2) Any agreements that have not been denounced shall continue to be
in force until they are duly denounced in pursuance of their own rules of
denunciation.
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Section 15
Provided agreement has been reached on the general questions between
the central organisations before March 1, the changes agreed upon relating
to wages, overtime payment, payment for work in shifts, or any similar
changes in regard to wages shall come into force as from the commencement
of the first pay-week after March 1.
Section 16
This Agreement shall remain in force until it is denounced by a notice of
six months to expire on a July 1.

